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Abstract: This article offers a theoretical framework that can be used to derive viable 
engineering strategies for the design and development of robots that can nudge people 
towards moral improvement. The framework relies on research in developmental 
psychology and insights from Stoic ethics. Stoicism recommends contemplative prac-
tices that over time help one develop dispositions to behave in ways that improve the 
functioning of mechanisms that are constitutive of moral cognition. Robots can nudge 
individuals towards these practices and can therefore help develop the dispositions to, 
for example, extend concern to others, avoid parochialism, etc.
Key words: moral improvement, moral development, robotic companions, social ro-
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1. Introduction
Robots that interact with humans are not typically designed to help improve moral 
cognition or moral behavior, broadly construed. Nonetheless, they could in prin-
ciple serve as surrogates for moral teachers or compliment whatever moral educa-
tion children get at home or school. One way that robots could do this is by being 
a source of nudges (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). In a recent review of the debate on 
nudges, Cass Sunstein defines them in the following comprehensive way:
Nudges are interventions that steer people in particular directions but that 
also allow them to go their own way. A reminder is a nudge; so is a warning. 
A GPS nudges; a default rule nudges. To qualify as a nudge, an intervention 
must not impose significant material incentives. A subsidy is not a nudge; a 
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tax is not a nudge; a fine or a jail sentence is not a nudge. To count as such, 
a nudge must fully preserve freedom of choice. If an intervention imposes 
significant material costs on choosers, it might of course be justified, but it 
is not a nudge. Some nudges work because they inform people; other nudg-
es work because they make certain choice easier; still other nudges work 
because of the power of inertia and procrastination. (Sunstein 2015, 7–8)
There are other definitions of a nudge and a variety of uses for nudging (e.g., 
Schmidt 2017, for review look: Barton and Grüne-Yanoff 2015). For example, 
there are definitions of “nudge” that limits them to those interventions that target 
cognitively shallow processes and leave open the possibility for the person being 
nudged not doing what they are nudged to do (Saghai 2013). Nudges can be used 
to lead people to healthier lifestyles or be more careful while urinating, among m 
any other things.
The definition of a nudge operative in this article is close to Sunstein’s above 
in that the interventions proposed here aim to stimulate conscious reflection with-
out compromising their target’s ability to choose to do otherwise. It is important 
to note, however, that while these nudges engage conscious high-level cognition, 
their ultimate aim is to influence the operation of lower-level mechanisms. For 
example, some proposed nudges prompt individuals to ask questions about their 
choices, values, and lives with the aim of improving their disposition to take the 
perspective of others.
It should also be noted that all of the proposed nudges could be implemented 
in a computer program that is not embodied in a robotic chassis. Given this, the 
present proposal can be counted among other computer-aided moral improvement 
technologies proposed in the literature. Among these is the artificial moral advisor 
proposed by Giubilini and Savulescu (Giubilini and Savulescu 2018) that is de-
signed to promote a capacity for reflective equilibrium. There is also the ambient 
intelligence system proposed by Savulescu and Maslen (Savulescu and Maslen 
2015) that can prompt its users about their emotional state, whenever they find 
themselves in a morally-charged situation, and even give advice based on previ-
ously selected values, such as concern for justice or honesty. There are also pro-
posals that stress the importance of dialogue and argument, so an artificial moral 
reasoner (Klincewicz 2016; Lara and Deckers 2019). This raises the question of 
what putting nudges into a robot adds to those others computer-based solutions.
Embodiment in a chassis—ideally more-or-less humanoid—affords advan-
tages that are not achievable with a phone app or computer application. As anyone 
that has interacted with a humanoid robot can attest, an appropriately designed 
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robot can engage us emotionally (Asada et al. 2009). A robot’s smile, nod, or 
other programmed gesture can elicit a strong response. This offers an opportunity 
to target affective mechanisms that comprise moral cognition more directly. Other 
computer-based proposals for moral improvement that do not rely on a chassis do 
not afford this possibility. Besides, robotic nudges have already been shown to 
be effective in contexts with a moral dimension, e.g., when the robot resembles a 
person with authority (Aroyo et al. 2018) and in an ultimatum game paradigm (Di 
Dio et al. 2019).
The second major difference between the present proposal and other existing 
proposals for moral improvement with computing technology is that the nudges 
proposed here are inspired by Stoic practices. These practices have had a long 
track-record of being useful to politicians, generals, orators, and other non-phi-
losophers in Ancient Greece and Rome. Practical advice that we inherited from 
this tradition has also been re-purposed in contemporary cognitive-behavioral 
therapy (CBT) (Clark and Egan 2015), with relative success. The link between 
Stoic practices and CBT is acknowledged by contemporary scholars as well as the 
founders of CBT themselves (for review look: Murguia and Diaz 2015; Robertson 
2016; Beck 1979). One may even say that CBT continues with the Stoic idea 
that through appropriately directed conscious reflection we can help improve the 
overall quality of our psychological functioning.
Systematic reviews of meta-analyses of CBT studies consistently conclude 
that it is effective in treating a variety of psychological conditions, such as anxiety 
and depression (Beck 1991; Butler et al. 2006; Kazantzis et al. 2018). The roots of 
CBT practices in Stoic practices suggests then that we may be cautiously optimis-
tic about the efficacy of Stoic practices themselves. If CBT is successful, then we 
have indirect evidence that Stoic practices may be effective for the purposes that 
they were originally intended for, namely, changing moral behavior. This reliance 
on Stoic practices to facilitate moral improvement is the second major difference 
between the present proposal and those present in the literature.
Section 2 of this article critically reviews some existing proposals of robotic 
moral nudgers. Section 3 reviews evidence from across the cognitive sciences to 
make the case for a capacity approach to nudging towards moral improvement. 
Section 4.1 presents a selection of Stoic practices that can inform engineering 
strategies that would help develop moral capacities. Section 4.2 develops the Stoic 
assumption that developing those capacities is a promising way towards moral im-
provement. Section 5 states and answers an objection to the development of robots 
that can morally improve through nudges, which is that there are less expensive 
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and more effective ways of stimulating moral development and moral improve-
ment. In response, robotic nudgers offer some unique possibilities that are not 
available through other means, thus at least partially justifying the cost of their 
design and development.
2. Moral Improvement with Robotic Nudges
The semantics of ‘improvement,’ ‘enhancement,’ and ‘therapy’ are closely linked 
and there are several ways of differentiating between their meanings. For example, 
the distinction between ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’ is particularly important in 
context of medicine:
In broad terms, therapy aims to fix something that has gone wrong, by cur-
ing specific diseases or injuries, while enhancement interventions aim to 
improve the state of an organism beyond its normal healthy state. (Bostrom 
and Roache 2008, 120)
On this view, therapy and enhancement can be thought of as falling under the more 
general concept of improvement. Therapy aims at improvement to normal, while 
enhancement aims at improvement beyond normal.
One problem with this way of making the distinction between different types 
of improvement is that it assumes some notion of normality, which inevitably 
imports statistical or normative assumptions about human nature. In a medical 
context this burden may sometimes be worth accepting. Prima facie, a medical pro-
fessional should treat the infirm, but does not have an equal obligation to enhance 
the healthy. So, one may argue, the therapy/enhancement distinction may help to 
justly distribute limited medical resources in society (Kluge 2007; Daniels 1996).
In context of moral behavior, the burden of relying on the notion of a statisti-
cally normal person or some norm of an ideal person is more difficult to justify. It 
is not at all clear what it means to be morally normal and further whether normality 
should play any role in defining what counts as moral improvement (Daniels 2009; 
Kingma 2007). For one, it is not obvious why we should not always strive to go be-
yond what is morally normal for our species. The often-cited motivation for whole-
sale moral improvement, namely, the possibility of global catastrophe caused by 
our species’ tribal moral psychology, seems to demand that we do in fact go beyond 
what is normal (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 12). Secondly, people have complex 
moral psychologies that can differ substantially across individuals. For example, 
one person may be above average in their concern for social justice, but find it hard 
to care about particular individuals, while another could be the opposite. Averaging 
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concern for social justice and care for individuals across these two persons would 
give us a distorted picture of what a normal moral psychology is like.
Given these complications, in the remainder of the article the more general 
notion of moral improvement will be used to refer to all the strategies that can 
inform moral nudges embodied in robots. This is meant to underline the distinction 
between the more general notion of moral improvement and moral enhancement as 
it is used in the literature to refer to improvement techniques that take advantage of 
biological, genetic, and neural interventions (Douglas 2008). Moral improvement 
can also be used to signify moral therapy, with its medical connotations, for special 
cases where moral improvement techniques can be useful is helping those whose 
moral development has in some way been derailed. Candidates for moral improve-
ment as therapy may be, for example, young adults that display personality traits 
from the so-called dark triad (Paulhus and Williams 2002), child soldiers (Wessells 
2006), or compulsive liars (Dike, Baranoski, and Griffith 2005). In similar vein, 
Stoic practices will be characterized as potential methods of moral improvement 
in this broad sense, thus ignoring their specific aims within Stoic philosophy, or 
characteristics of individuals and groups that may be targets for them.
Robots that could be used in the task of moral improvement have been 
proposed by Jason Borenstein and Ronald Arkin (Borenstein and Arkin 2016b; 
Borenstein and Arkin 2016a). Their idea is to use the robot as a source of nudges, 
which “could range from the sophisticated and subtle (such as crossing its arms 
and tilting its head) to the blunt and obvious (such as voicing the phrase ‘please 
stop doing that’)” (Borenstein and Arkin 2016b, 35).
Borenstein and Arkin argue that John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness 
(Rawls 2009; Rawls 2001) can serve as the theoretical background against which 
specific moral nudges could be programmed into the robot. It is worth quoting 
them at length to illustrate how this would work:
[Robotic nudges] could nurture ‘‘inequality aversion’’ in young children 
by reinforcing proper social norms and etiquette during playtime. For ex-
ample, a robotic companion could smile or display other social cues that 
encourage the sharing of toys between playmates. Along these lines, the 
robot could mimic expressions of disappointment if a child refuses to share. 
Furthermore, the robot could nudge a child to interact with other children 
with whom he/she is not as used to engaging in the effort to avoid ‘‘paro-
chialism.’’ (Borenstein and Arkin 2016b, 40)
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According to Borenstein and Arkin, parochialism and lack of concern for inequal-
ity are not conducive to concern for social justice on the conception of justice 
adopted by Rawls.
What motivates Borenstein and Arkin in making this connection is Rawls’s 
second principle of justice: “social and economic inequalities, for example in-
equalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating 
benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of so-
ciety” (Rawls 2009, 13). They stipulate that encouraging inequality aversion and 
parochialism aversion with robotic nudges would amount to an indirect method 
of inculcating people with concern for Rawls’s second principle. If this is right, 
improving those attitudes via nudges would amount to moral improvement, from 
a Rawlsian perspective.
One could disagree with this stipulation and point out that inequality aver-
sion and aversion to parochialism are not exclusively Rawlsian attitudes and that 
many ethical frameworks are compatible with them.2 While Borenstein and Arkin 
acknowledge that they fall short of showing why it is that these attitudes as op-
posed to other attitudes should be encouraged, they, arguably, do not sufficiently 
explain why they take them to be Rawlsian as opposed to Kantian, Aristotelian, 
or corresponding to another moral theory. The role of theoretical assumptions in 
moral improvement proposals, including moral bio-enhancement, is a more gen-
eral problem that is unlikely to be solved soon (for review: Specker et al. 2014).
While Borenstein and Arkin’s idea may be hostage to a philosophical debate, 
the practical viability of their proposal leaves room for exploration of alternatives. 
A particularly promising strategy is a more theory-neutral approach, which focuses 
on aspects of moral psychology, rather than on specific moral attitudes or beliefs. 
Beliefs can be understood as either occurrent or dispositional mental states that are 
distinguished from other mental states by featuring an assertoric attitude. On this 
view, to believe something is to hold a certain attitude towards a content, which is 
typically expressed as a proposition that can be either true or false. Beliefs provide 
reasons, including those relevant to moral behavior and moral decision making.
Beliefs can be distinguished from capacities, which are understood as the 
sum of the psychological and neural mechanisms that make it possible for agents 
to have mental states, such as beliefs. On this view, high-level psychological phe-
nomena, such as believing that p, are understood to be decomposable through 
functional analysis into its component parts and realizers (Cummins 1975; Craver 
2007). This is a gross oversimplification that rides roughshod over a great deal of 
discussion in the philosophy of mind on the nature of beliefs. However, in context 
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of this article it allows us to distinguish proposals that focus on beliefs and at-
titudes, such as Borenstein and Arkin’s, from those that target the capacity to have 
such beliefs and its constituent mechanisms.
Proposals that fall into the latter category include those that aim to develop 
particular dispositions (Jebari 2014), reliability (Schaefer and Savulescu 2019), 
self-interest and cognitive capacity (Ahlskog 2017), or cognitive-affective mecha-
nisms that underlie moral dispositions (Klincewicz, Frank, and Sokólska 2018). 
These approaches all share the assumption that beliefs or attitudes are not the ap-
propriate targets for moral improvement, but the underlying capacities for having 
such beliefs are appropriate. One advantage of these views is that they do not have 
to wait for moral philosophy to deliver a verdict on which beliefs or attitudes are 
appropriate. Instead, they can focus on, for example, the psychological mechanism 
responsible for the ability to have moral attitudes in general. This mechanism may 
be important to moral behavior and moral decision-making regardless of which 
normative theory or metaethical position turns out to be right.
Focusing on mechanisms and capacities is not in itself completely theory-
neutral. Each time a mechanism is considered as important to moral decision-mak-
ing or moral behavior, assumptions about moral psychology and moral behavior 
are smuggled in. These assumptions will aim to capture the surface phenomenon 
of human moral behavior by answering questions such as: is this a morally-
charged decision? Does this action have a morally significant consequence? Or, 
what distinguishes moral behavior from non-moral behavior? Arguably, answers 
to these sorts of questions will be roughly the same across first-order normative 
theories and metaethical positions (for example, see: Sterba 2004).
Borenstein and Arkin consider a capacities approach in a follow-up paper, 
which describes robotic nudges that encourage “performance of charitable acts” 
and “promote the good of society” via nurturing empathy (Borenstein and Arkin 
2016a). The upshot of their discussion is that
[e]quipped with the knowledge of affective computing and other disci-
plines, roboticists could exert profound power over the humans that interact 
with robots. Thus, we sought to explore a possible design pathway whereby 
robots would seek to nurture a user’s empathy toward other human beings 
and more specifically, nudge the user toward the performance of charitable 
acts. (Borenstein and Arkin 2016a, 8)
This sets a modest and achievable goal of improving morally relevant capacities 
with existing solutions in affective computing (Picard 1997; Calvo et al. 2014). 
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For example, we can imagine a pattern recognizer that can detect when people 
take on the perspective of others or become angry and pass this information to a 
robot, which can use that information to generate an appropriate nudge.
The problem with that proposal is that it is not clear why performance of 
charitable acts and promoting the good of society should be encouraged by the ro-
botic nudger as opposed to something else. Secondly, empathy, which Borenstein 
and Arkin focus on, has several competing theoretical accounts in psychology and 
philosophy (for review: Cuff et al. 2016; Stueber 2017). Furthermore, empathy’s 
role in moral cognition has advocates (Hoffman 2001), but also detractors (Mai-
bom 2014; Isserow 2015; Huebner 2015). There are also reasons to think that em-
pathy is, at times, not morally desirable at all. Paul Bloom, among others, points 
out that empathy introduces biases into moral deliberation that cause us to put too 
much value on those people we easily empathize with and too little on those with 
which we do not (Bloom 2017).
The controversial nature of empathy puts pressure on Borenstein and Arkin’s 
version of the capacities approach to moral improvement via robotic nudges. It also 
suggests a posture of caution about any particular moral capacity or set of mecha-
nisms being the key to moral improvement across all individuals. There may be 
significant individual and group differences that demand a more nuanced approach.
Even with these criticisms in mind, the robots Borenstein and Arkin describe 
can serve an important role in stimulating the development of psychological ca-
pacities that underlie moral decision-making, and in particular those capacities 
that are connected to emotions. For example, helping affective perspective taking 
develop in young people, especially those in risky environments, such as conflict 
zones or juvenile detention centers, may be a role that robotic nudgers can ful-
fill uniquely. In sum, Borenstein and Arkin’s arguments make it possible to think 
about social robots as a source of nudges towards moral improvement, the strate-
gies they adopt in that task, that is, the Rawlsian framework and a moral capacities 
approach that focuses on empathy, are not optimal. A good source of possible 
alternative capacities to focus on is the wealth of research on moral development 
across neuroscience and developmental psychology.
3. Moral Development
The idea that moral development is connected to psychological development is rela-
tively new. It was made scientifically prominent by such luminaries of psychology 
as Emile Durkheim, Pierre Piaget and eventually Lawrence Kohlberg (Snarey and 
Samuelson 2008). On Kohlberg’s view, human beings move through six stages of 
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moral maturity, which start from a child’s conception of the relationship between 
obedience and punishment all the way to abstract reasoning that involves duties 
and imperatives (Kohlberg 1984). If that were right, moral improvement would be 
a matter of moving through these stages as quickly as possible until one reaches 
the last, which eminently involves cognitive capacities, such as abstract reasoning.
Kohlberg’s view has come under significant criticism largely on the basis of 
individual and group differences in moral reasoning (Hwang 2015; Snarey 1985). 
There is a significant amount of evidence that people that Kohlberg’s view would 
place at the same level of moral development may use significantly different strat-
egies and psychological means to make moral decisions (Krebs and Denton 2005). 
This suggests that people can differ significantly with respect to their psychologi-
cal development yet be on the same stage of moral development or vice versa.
Kohlberg’s emphasis on justice, rights, and reasoning has also come under 
significant criticism from Carol Gilligan (1977). Gilligan points out that a capacity 
for care is an equally important component of moral cognition and development 
that Kohlberg’s theory neglects. Gilligan’s approach has mounting support in biol-
ogy, neuroscience, and social sciences, which all support the view that affective 
mechanisms neglected by Kohlberg’s theory play an important role in moral cog-
nition. Current research into moral development encompasses this more nuanced 
approach (Lapsley and Narvaez 2005; Lapsley and Carlo 2014; Walker 2004), 
which characterizes moral development as an aspect of a multifaceted process 
of psychological development (Johnson 2015). Emotional development plays an 
important role in a child’s development of moral capacities (Pizarro, Detweiler-
Bedell, and Bloom 2006). On this view, the level of an individual’s moral develop-
ment is typically assessed by measures of pro-social attitudes, ability to engage in 
moral reasoning, and other, related capacities, such as capacity for care.
What many theorists seem to agree on is that moral cognition is realized by 
a complex network of cognitive and affective mechanisms, rather than by a single, 
domain-specific mechanism (Greene 2015) and that moral development is dy-
namic (Van Bavel, FeldmanHall, and Mende-Siedlecki 2015). This more complex 
picture according to which moral development involves distinct stages connected 
to the maturation of distinct emotional and cognitive capacities (Cowell and De-
cety 2015) diverges significantly from the Kohlbergian conception. It is also sup-
ported by empirical studies, which demonstrate that distinct neural mechanisms 
are involved in moral behavior at different ages. Affective mechanisms are shown 
to underlie moral dispositions in infants (Vaish, Grossmann, and Woodward 2008; 
Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 2010) and likely involve subcortical structures, but not 
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to the same degree in young people and adults (Hyde, Shaw, and Hariri 2013). A 
similar conclusion is supported by lesion studies of younger people with dam-
age to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and amygdala, which display significant 
problems in processing morally laden stimuli and social emotions (Gupta, Tranel, 
and Duff 2012). Similar damage later in life affects these processes significantly 
less. Studies of pathologies, especially in psychopaths, corroborate these conclu-
sions (Kennett and Fine 2008).
Decety and Howard summarize the way in which the amygdala/superior 
temporal sulcus/ventromedial prefrontal cortex neural network is involved in 
moral cognition (Decety and Howard 2013, 52–53; Decety and Cowell 2014). 
These structures are known to be responsible for integrating information from a 
variety of other brain regions, including those responsible for affect and motiva-
tion (Motzkin et al. 2015; Jalbrzikowski et al. 2017). With age the role of each 
component in the network changes in importance, with emphasis often moving 
from affective processing to cognitive processing.
In general, empirical studies on moral development strongly suggest that the 
moral psychology of children and young adults is significantly different from that 
of adults and that these differences are both anatomical and functional. This view 
is further supported by what we know about the way that people develop other 
aspects of their social cognition. For example, young adults do not always have 
a fully developed prefrontal cortex, critical to decision-making in general, and 
moral decision-making in particular. Young adults nonetheless can and do make 
moral decisions, which further supports the view that their moral psychologies 
are typically realized by a different complex of psychological capacities than that 
of adults (Caballero, Granberg, and Tseng 2016). Moral improvement interven-
tions should be sensitive to the fact that affective mechanisms, specifically those 
involved in empathy, are important at a young age. Higher-order cognition seems 
to become more important later in development.
The design of moral improvement interventions is further complicated by the 
fact that a child’s moral development can be derailed by many things, which can 
be obscure to a professional. Inadequate pro-social stimulation (Padilla-Walker 
2014), brain lesions (Taber-Thomas et al. 2014), trauma (Narvaez and Lapsley 
2014), and a range of other factors can all impact moral development (Gibbs 
2010). What further compounds the difficulty is that we have strong evidence that 
changes in behavior are accompanied by neuroanatomical changes (Sandi and 
Haller 2015; Glenn and Raine 2014).3
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These observations about moral development have significant implications 
for strategies of moral improvement. Most importantly, moral improvement in-
terventions should not take a one-size-fits-all approach that targets one specific 
capacity or neural realizer of moral cognition. Ideally, they would take all the 
relevant mechanisms into account or focus on the unique ways in which moral 
cognition is realized in each individual. Moral therapy, if there were such a clini-
cal practice, would then be an interdisciplinary domain mainly for clinical and 
developmental psychologists.
It is here that focusing on capacities and constituent mechanisms of moral 
cognition, as opposed to specific beliefs and attitudes, proves its superiority as an 
approach to moral improvement. Take, for example, the psychological mechanism 
responsible for affective perspective taking, which underlies some of the moral 
decisions that people may make about others. Focusing on improvement of the 
functioning of that particular mechanism will likely lead to the development of 
an overall improvement in concern for others, including those that are not like us. 
Furthermore, this approach offers a way generate empirically testable hypotheses, 
such as the one about affective perspective taking and care, that can be tested in 
particular individuals and in groups.
Robots designed to deliver interventions that target specific mechanisms rel-
evant to moral development may be a way to supplement the work of therapists 
and give them a powerful tool. The robotic nudgers proposed by Borenstein and 
Arkin (Borenstein and Arkin 2016a) could, as they speculate, facilitate emotional 
development relevant to moral cognition in children and possibly also in adults. 
But instead of being designed to promote Rawlsian principles or empathy they 
would need to be designed with strategies for improvement of other psychologi-
cal capacities relevant to moral behavior and moral decision-making. Concrete 
strategies to this end can be found in Stoic moral theory, which has recently been 
suggested as an alternative to the typical utilitarian/deontological strategies con-
sidered for moral AI systems (Murray 2017).
4. Stoicism and Moral Improvement
4.1. Stoic Practice
Stoicism was one of the major schools of ancient philosophy with a developed 
metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, logic, and ethics (Schofield 
2003). Not much of this remains, except for fragments, which makes a thorough 
reconstruction of Stoicism difficult. What is best preserved is practical advice, 
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presumably grounded in all that theory, and passed on through the writings of 
statesmen and orators, such as Marcus Aurelius and Cicero.4 The selection of these 
practices below is not exhaustive, but for each a brief speculative sketch about how 
it can be embodied in a social robot is provided.
1. Assessment of control. Stoics recommend that people learn to distinguish 
between things that they have full control over from those that they have partial 
or no control over. Attempting to influence things that we have no or little control 
over is usually futile. The idea here is that once we learn to discern them, we will 
commit less time and mental energy to things that can only frustrate us (Epictetus 
1983, 1).
A robotic nudger can be designed to help its user develop the ability to dis-
criminate what is up to them and what is not. For example, the robot could nudge 
its user to reflect on the amount of control that they have over what they hear on 
the news. Or the nudger could make the relevant distinctions themselves and then 
confront them with the distinctions that its user makes.
To work well, the robotic nudger would have to be designed with the ability 
to discern appropriate times and topics for this assessment. It is not clear what 
criteria should be used in this task, but a good first pass may be a recorded history 
of topics, situations, and bodily responses of its user. When confronted with some-
thing that is likely to elicit negative emotions, the robotic companion could pre-
emptively prompt to reflect on the amount of control one has over that something.
2. Imagining calamity involves visualizing or thinking about the loss of 
something dear. Epictetus recommends:
If, for example, you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind yourself that 
it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, 
you will not be disturbed. (Epictetus 1983, 3)
The goal of this practice is to maintain one’s appreciation for having the ceramic 
cup and also combat dispositions to cling to it. A robotic companion could prompt 
its user to engage in imagining the loss of something dear by asking relevant ques-
tions, such as “what if your ceramic cup was broken?”
Taken to extremes this practice can be jarring. Epictetus suggests that “if you 
kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and 
thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies” (Epictetus 1983, 3). It is dif-
ficult to expect anything good to come from a robot prompting a happily married 
father with the question “what if your wife and children were dead?” To avoid 
such extremes, the robot should be able make the relevant distinctions among 
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things that are appropriate for this technique and those that are out of bounds. 
To accomplish this, the engineer may want to create a mechanism for creating a 
hierarchy of values and things that are dear to the user. This hierarchy may then 
be categorized by a psychologist, perhaps with an eye to principles of cognitive-
behavioral therapy. This would go far is avoiding a situation in which the robot 
would become a nuisance rather than a useful nudger.
3. Preparation for and review of the day. This practice has several different 
across each prominent Stoic thinker. Here is an excerpt from Marcus Aurelius’s 
advice for the morning:
Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busy-body, the 
ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen 
to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. (Aurelius 
2013, 2.1)
And Seneca’s advice for going to sleep:
I shall keep watching myself continually, and—a most useful habit—shall 
review each day. For this is what makes us wicked: that no one of us looks 
back over his own life. Our thoughts are devoted only to what we are about 
to do. And yet our plans for the future always depend on the past. (Seneca 
2001, 83.2)
The goal of these recommendations is the same: to be reminded of one’s place in 
the world and to foster a mindful and tranquil disposition in the face of frustration 
and ill-will of others.
There is no one-size-fits-all method of preparing for and reviewing the day. 
There are also probably many ways in which a robotic companion could nudge its 
user to engage in preparation for and review of the day. The simplest would be to 
prompt with “have you reviewed your day?” But we could also imagine a more 
involved method with leading questions or a template, which would make it easier 
for the user to reflect on relevant aspects of the day, such as lunch with a colleague, 
small frustrations with a partner, etc.
4. Staying in the present. Reviewing one’s day does not mean the same as 
ruminating about what could have been, which the Stoics consider to be danger-
ous. To counteract the tendency to ruminate, the Stoics recommend staying busy. 
For example, Seneca tells us:
The present is short, the future is doubtful, the past is certain. For this last 
is the one over which Fortune has lost her power, which cannot be brought 
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back to anyone’s control. But this is what preoccupied people lose: for they 
have no time to look back at their past, and even if they did, it is not pleasant 
to recall activities they are ashamed of. (Seneca 2004, 2.1)
Seneca’s observation recommends we occupy ourselves, so we would spend less 
time thinking about what could have been. Confirming this recommendation, re-
cent experiments suggest that indeed ruminating on negative aspects of the past 
correlates with lowered psychological well-being (Blouin-Hudon and Zelenski 
2016).
A general recommendation, such as “stay in the present” or “stay busy” does 
not straightforwardly lead to specific practices. But even a general recommenda-
tion, such as to be mindful, can be suggestive to a range of therapeutic strategies 
(Germer, Siegel, and Fulton 2016). Cognitive therapists use cognates of “stay in 
the present” to remind their clients to not ruminate, for example. Being mindful 
can also refer to directed attention, such as in some forms of meditation. Prompts 
to be mindful can be implemented in a robotic nudger to suggest any one of these, 
including meditation or directed attention.
Natural language analysis from artificial intelligence (Hirschberg and Man-
ning 2015) could be especially useful here. We could imagine a robotic nudger that 
can identify negative ruminating on the past in its user’s language use (Wildschut 
et al. 2006). The input for this analysis could be the linguistic corpus produced 
in strategies (1), (2), and (3), but it could also be interviews or a therapist report. 
The output would of course be an appropriate nudge or dialogue that suggests a 
positive aspect of the situation one tends to ruminate about.
5. Controlling one’s emotions. Negative emotions attract a lot of the Stoics’ 
attention. Cicero compares negative emotions to insanity (Cicero 2002, 3.23, 3.5) 
and recommends philosophy—understood here to be engaging one’s reasoning 
ability—as cure. Similarly, Marcus Aurelius offers a wide range of examples of 
how to think about the emotions and their causes (Aurelius 2013, 9, 11). Most 
Stoics recommend thinking through the unreasonableness of one’s emotional per-
turbations and expect this practice to eventually change one’s dispositions to have 
them. With the dispositions changed, the Stoic will presumably stop getting angry 
at, say, their noisy neighbor or at things in general.
There is a lot that a robotic nudger could do to encourage reflection on the 
causes of one’s emotional perturbances. Most of the strategies discussed above 
are, arguably, versions of this more general strategy. This is also where Borenstein 
and Arkin’s own proposal may not need much else than they already provide. 
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What may make it even better is equipping the robotic nudger with the ability to 
discern emotions in the user and perhaps even anticipate them, so as to be able to 
interrupt them or facilitate thinking through them. Insights and work in affective 
computing could be paramount to achieving this end.
To sum up, this article has so far outlined the theoretical framework for de-
signing robotic nudges for moral improvement based on Stoic practices and on in-
sights from psychology and developmental science. Stoic practices were originally 
developed with moral improvement in mind, but have proved successful in cogni-
tive-behavioral therapy. This success indirectly supports some optimism about the 
success of Stoic practices themselves. However, it does not allay any worry that 
may arise about the potential success of any individual Stoic practice embodied 
in a robotic nudge. The practical and ethical issues that bear on each practice as 
embodied in a robotic nudger is beyond the scope of this article and should instead 
be address by empirical work at the intersection of psychology, human-robot in-
teraction studies, and moral philosophy. We cannot speculate a priori about the 
potential success of any of these at the present moment, but we can be hopeful, 
given the success of Stoic practices channeled via cognitive-behavioral therapy.
4.2. Stoic Doctrine of oikeiosis
Most ancient moral theories, including the Stoic one, conceives of being moral as 
a matter of a person reaching a certain state. For the Stoics in particular this state 
is oikeiosis—an enlargement of what one takes to be his or her own achieved by 
maximally expanding the range of one’s concern from oneself to others by ap-
propriate exercise of reason (Pembroke 1971). Appropriate exercise of reason can 
mean many things and practices like the ones listed in Section 4.1 are all examples 
of it. This idea can also be understood as a shorthand for a state of moral virtue 
marked by the four traditional ancient virtues: temperance, courage, wisdom, and 
justice. The key to reaching oikeiosis are the emotions, and specifically, an attitude 
towards emotions that Stoic practices aim to cultivate.
There are several intermediate stages before maximal oikeiosis is attained 
and in all but the first stage the key to achieving success is making rational choices 
based on sound logic. Cicero sketches out five such stages and marks out the role 
of reason in each one:
The first ‘proper function’ . . . is to preserve oneself in one’s natural con-
stitution; the second is to seize hold of the things that accord with nature 
and to banish their opposites. Once this procedure of selection and rejec-
tion has been discovered, the next consequence is selection exercised with 
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proper functioning; then such selection is performed continuously; finally, 
selection which is absolutely consistent and in full accordance with nature. 
(Cicero 2001, 3.20–1)
On this view, a person’s actual choice and natural choice become ever more in 
sync until they become the same when one reaches maximal oikeiosis. At that 
point, a person is in harmony with nature and most free.
The goal of being in harmony with nature cannot be fully appreciated without 
a better understanding of Stoic metaphysics. As Gisela Striker explains:
The Stoic conception of the end does not arise as a natural continuation of 
one’s concern for self-preservation, but rather as the result of one’s reflec-
tion upon the way nature has arranged human behavior in the context of an 
admirable cosmic order. (Striker 1991, 230)
According to the Stoics, this admirable cosmic order is deterministic and beyond 
what a human mind can fully grasp. Nonetheless, even though the whole mecha-
nism is incomprehensible, one’s place in it can be made apparent by practicing 
Stoic ethics and maximizing oikeiosis. The idea of an admirable cosmic order is 
unlikely to motivate many people to engage in the project of maximizing oikeiosis 
or to become a Stoic. This is perhaps why the final stage in Cicero’s description 
of “selection which is absolutely consistent and in full accordance with nature” is 
also considered by the Stoics to be very difficult to achieve. It is perhaps also why 
Stoic ethics does not have many adherents today.
Those unmoved by the idea of being a gear in the mechanism of the ad-
mirable cosmic order may be more moved by the characterization of oikeiosis 
in psychological terms.5 Hierocles provides this description as the final stage of 
a successive development towards moral virtue. Stages in this development are 
marked by extending the range of concern from oneself, to parents, siblings, wife, 
and children, then to uncles, aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces and cousins, to 
other relatives, to local residents, fellow tribesmen, etc. “The outermost and larg-
est circle, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race” (Long 
and Sedley 1987, citing Stobaeus 4.671.7–4.673.11).
On Hierocles’s account, the key to maximizing oikeiosis is reaching a men-
tal state in which one’s concern extends to an ever-wider range of people. This 
squares well with Malcolm Schofield’s suggestion that “oikeiosis theory proposes 
that concern for others depends on identifying with them in some way or to some 
extent. . . . It involves the disposition to adopt the other’s point of view” (Schofield 
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1995, 196; Schofield’s emphasis). Identification with others and adopting their 
point of view is what we oftentimes call empathizing. However, it is important to 
note that the contemporary psychological category that best fits the Stoics’ con-
ception is not an emotive attitude, nor a belief, but something akin to perception.
To avoid anachronisms, the relevant mental state can be cautiously analyzed 
as having two parts: a mental attitude and (propositional) content. We can thus char-
acterize Hierocles’s idea of the expanding oikeiosis with a shorthand ‘O’ attitude:
A) Sam Os ‘Sam’
B) Sam Os ‘Sam’s mother’
C) Sam Os ‘All the members of Sam’s species’
The O-attitude is distinguished from other propositional attitudes, such as believ-
ing or hoping, by the causal role it plays in the mental life of the person that has 
it—it is inherently motivational. Its essential feature is to bring about concern for 
the well-being of whatever it is directed at by identifying with them, but it is not 
identical with that concern.
On this model, as the content of one’s O-attitudes becomes more general, as 
is the case from (A) to (B) to (C), one progresses towards maximal oikeiosis. Hi-
erocles’s idea is that we should end up with a stable, emotion-like attitude, rather 
than a mere belief with ever more general content. But reason and logic are still 
essential, as they are the basis for all the Stoic exercises mentioned in Section 4.1. 
Just as with Cicero’s stages in understanding the cosmic order, Hierocles thinks 
that a Stoic uses reason and logic to move towards each successive stage.
If the Stoics are right about any of this, an individual’s moral progress can be 
measured independently from the development of ability to engage in any of the 
practices and exercises they suggest. A measure of this development is the scope 
of concern with others, that is, the level of generality of the O-attitude. The more 
cosmopolitan we are, the more virtuous we are. The more parochial we are, the 
less virtuous we are. Importantly, this idea applies to everyone, not only to people 
that have had their moral development derailed, such as child soldiers or compul-
sive liars. The Stoics emphasized that their practical advice and exercises can be 
used by people of all ages, regardless of their education, ability or socioeconomic 
status. What this suggests, is that if the robotic nudger proposed here can help 
people with problems in their moral development, they could equally help with 
people without such problems. This gives genuine hope for moral improvement 
that relies on robotic nudging technology.
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5. Should We Bother Building Robotic Nudgers for Moral Improvement?
Long-term use of social robots raises ethical concerns that should be addressed in 
any future development (Coeckelbergh et al. 2016). Programming ethics or moral-
ity into robots is also subject to a number of “rookie mistakes” that are the con-
sequence of the relative lack of clarity about what ethics and morality are among 
engineers (Gordon 2019). While the promise of long-term use of robots in care, 
therapy, and companionship is better than ever, it also faces significant limitations 
(Cabibihan et al. 2013; Leite, Martinho, and Paiva 2013; Frank 2019). The main 
limitation for their widespread use is practical: it remains prohibitively costly to 
design and develop humanoid robots that work as intended. This last concern is 
particularly pressing for robotic nudgers, since it is not clear what the benefit of 
using them is, as compared to other solutions.
The development, deployment, and use of sophisticated robotic nudgers 
would indeed involve a great amount of research and resources. Furthermore, 
it remains unclear whether they can ever achieve the kind of sophistication that 
would be necessary to aid the developmentally challenged or to facilitate moral 
improvement in children, or in adults. Finally, the possibility of implementing 
Stoic practices and their potential effectiveness in therapy is speculative and sup-
port for it indirect, since it depends on success of cognitive-behavioral techniques. 
On the other hand, it seems just as likely that the same amount of research and 
resources put towards caretakers, teachers, and therapists would achieve as much, 
if not more, to allay derailed moral development or to morally improve. In short, 
humans—Stoic or otherwise—may do as well as the robots and for less, which 
means that we lack a substantive reason to develop this technology.
In reply, one should concede that robotic nudgers cannot replace caretakers, 
teachers, and therapists, at the present time. They can nonetheless be an effective 
supplement to what all of these professionals can accomplish on their own. There 
are also independent reasons to think that this technology could provide unique 
new opportunities that could not be otherwise realized.
Robots can help people with developmental problems develop an emotional 
bond and to engage emotionally in ways not achievable with disembodied comput-
er programs or even human caretakers. The affordance of emotional engagement is 
perhaps also why robots have been used in behavioral therapy with relative success 
and why robots designed to help the elderly or people with cognitive impairments 
have been the subject of significant recent research and development (Robinson, 
MacDonald, and Broadbent 2014; Doering et al. 2016; Gross et al. 2016; Gross et 
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al. 2015; Fischinger et al. 2016; Magnenat-Thalmann and Zhang 2014). Existing 
solutions achieve a modest amount of success in the tasks for which they were 
designed (Peri et al. 2016; Ahn et al. 2014). For example, a recent empirical study 
shows that lonely seniors are more likely to take a walk when accompanied by a 
robotic companion (Karunarathne et al. 2018). Robots can also significantly help 
in second-language acquisition (Belpaeme et al. 2015).
The effectiveness of robots in therapy and education of clinical populations 
has been demonstrated in several empirical studies. First, the robot Kaspar fa-
cilitated learning cause-and-effect relationships and awareness of self in children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) through tactile play scenarios (Robins and 
Dautenhahn 2014). Models of kinematics for therapy robots for children with au-
tism engage them with great success (Ge, Park, and Howard 2016). In other words, 
children with autism and possibly also other developmental problems (Standen 
et al. 2016), are likely to engage robots in play and disengage from their often 
closed-in inner lives. They can do this when they would not with other people.
Second, it been shown that children with ASD are generally more likely to 
engage robots in joint attention (JA):
[C]hildren with ASD who interacted with the robot had better outcomes in 
terms of JA than the children who interacted with a human agent during all 
sessions and exhibited improved performance in a JA task with human after 
interacting with the robot. (Kumazaki et al. 2018, 6)
In context of ASD robots are unique, in that they can engage people that are other-
wise disengaged from human caregivers or instructors. Robots have been shown to 
be uniquely useful in helping people with developmental problems, such as autism 
(Costa et al. 2015) and even Down syndrome (Lehmann et al. 2014) where human 
interaction has failed.
The unique opportunity that robotic nudgers give that caretakers do not is 
their being robots and not people. They remain emotionally engaging, because of 
their ability to elicit emotional responses. These unique features of therapy robots 
may equally help interventions on people affected by problems in moral develop-
ment and those seeking moral improvement. A robotic nudge that embodies Stoic 
practices would be more likely to work for such people than a similar prompt from 
a human: people disposed to violence, aggression, or anti-social behaviors, are so 
disposed towards people, not robots. This means that they may be less susceptible 
to actualize negative dispositions when dealing with situations analogous or even 
identical to those they could find with people. This in turn could lead to a change 
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in their dispositions in ways that would otherwise be impossible. This is a unique 
added value afforded only by non-human animals, which cannot engage in the sort 
of human-like behavior that robots can.
Another unique feature of social robots is that the amount of time that a 
potential user spends with them can far outrun what is possible with another per-
son. Long-term care of developmentally disabled can consume a large amount of 
resources, which may not always be available. When we consider these costs, we 
should realize that a similar amount of resources may never be diverted to those 
that may need moral rehabilitation or help in overcoming problems in their moral 
development. What is more likely is that help with their problems would be rel-
egated to their social support networks, if they have any, or to the judicial system. 
Robots, such as the robotic nudgers proposed here, can provide long-term care 
for these populations. It remains an open question whether this sort of interven-
tion can be achievable, the costs of building these sophisticated robotic nudgers 
notwithstanding.
6. Conclusion
Robotic nudgers can facilitate moral development or overcome problems with 
moral development, if their design focuses on the relevant psychological capaci-
ties. Stoic exercises, which have found their use in cognitive-behavioral therapy, 
are a good source of engineering strategies to implement as nudges in these robots. 
A further advantage of this approach is the possibility that it will also be sufficient 
for moral improvement through expansion of concern for others. The objection 
that robotic nudgers are too costly or unnecessary is blunted by considerations of 
the range of unique opportunities that robots provide, but it remains an open ques-
tion whether these considerations are sufficient to justify their cost.
Notes
I would like to thank anonymous reviewers and special editors for the many helpful 
and constructive comments that made this article reach its potential. An earlier version 
of this article was presented at the Philosophy of Risk seminar organized by Sven Ny-
holm as a part of The Dutch Research School of Philosophy (OZSW) in the Technical 
University of Eindhoven where I received helpful feedback. Parts of this article were 
submitted as a seminar paper in Richard Sorabji’s course on Stoic philosophy at the 
CUNY Graduate Center many years ago. Subsequent work on the paper was partially 
financed by the Polish National Science Centre (NCN) SONATA 9 Grant, PSP: K/
PBD/000139 under decision UMO-2015/17/D/HS1/01705.
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1. It is important to note that Stoicism should be understood within the histori-
cal context within which it was developed and should not be applied straightforwardly, 
without due changes, to the contemporary context. In this article Stoicism is presented 
without a sufficient discussion of its historical and dialectical context, but as a source 
of strategies that may, but need not be useful to contemporary moral concerns. Further-
more, some may worry that in order for these strategies to have any validity one should 
endorse Stoicism or that Stoicism has to be the right first-order normative theory. It 
should be stressed that this is not so. Stoic practical advice is useful in many contexts, 
even to those that are not Stoics.
2. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this journal for drawing my atten-
tion to this point.
3. However, moral improvement and moral development is often treated as a do-
main of parents or other primary caregivers or religious authority. As a consequence, 
the people that may benefit most from professional help in overcoming problems in 
their moral development are sometimes the ones least likely to get it.
4. I found Section 4 of Irvine 2008 particularly helpful in making up this list of 
practices.
5. Along with Malcolm Schofield I suppose that “we can explain the two meth-
odological approaches they reflect as complementary parts of a single coherent ar-
gumentative strategy” (Schofield 1995, 210), which has as its aim being in harmony 
with nature. The psychological and the metaphysical description together compose a 
comprehensive Stoic theory of compatibilism about free will, which is the view that 
the world is deterministic, but we can nonetheless be free to decide.
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